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Abstract
In many information-theoretic communication problems, adding an input cost constraint to the operational setup
amounts to restricting the optimization domain in the capacity formula. This paper shows that, in contrast to common
belief, such a simple modification does not hold for the cost-constrained (CC) wiretap channel (WTC). The secrecy-
capacity of the discrete memoryless (DM) WTC without cost constraints is described by a single auxiliary random
variable. For the CC DM-WTC, however, we show that two auxiliaries are necessary to achieve capacity. Specifically,
we first derive the secrecy-capacity formula, proving the direct part via superposition coding. Then, we provide an
example of a CC DM-WTC whose secrecy-capacity cannot be achieved using a single auxiliary. This establishes the
fundamental role of superposition coding over CC WTCs.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer security (PLS), rooted in information-theoretic principles, dates back to Wyner’s landmark 1975
paper [1], where the wiretap channel (WTC) was introduced. This model formulates reliable and secure communica-
tion over noisy channels in the presence of an eavesdropper (see Fig. 1). By harnessing randomness from the noisy
channel and combining it with proper physical layer coding, Wyner characterized the fundamental limit of reliable
and secure communication, termed the secrecy-capacity. For a memoryless WTC PY,Z|X , the secrecy-capacity is [2]
CWTC(PY,Z|X) = max
PV,X
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z), (1)
where the joint distribution is PV,XPY,Z|X (i.e., V − X − (Y,Z) forms a Markov chain) and V is an auxiliary
random variable. As PLS guarantees protection against computationally-unbounded adversaries without using shared
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2keys, Wyner’s formulation inspired a myriad of followup works. These included multiuser extensions [2]–[5], multi-
antenna settings [6]–[9], state-dependent WTCs [10]–[15], Gaussian WTCs [16]–[20], WTCs with feedback [21]–
[24], active adversaries [25]–[31], upgraded security metrics [32]–[39], practical wiretap codes [40]–[45], and more.
In this work, we revisit the classic WTC with an input cost constraint, and show that two-layered coding is
necessary for achieving its secrecy-capacity. In many information-theoretic communication problems, adding an
input cost constraint amounts to restricting the optimization domain in the capacity expression (e.g., the set of
feasible PV,X in (1)). We show that this reasoning is not valid for cost-constrained (CC) WTCs. To do so, we
characterize the CC secrecy-capacity using two auxiliary variables and prove that a single-auxiliary formula is
strictly suboptimal. For the latter, an example of a CC WTC is provided for which a two-layered scheme strictly
outperforms any single-layered code. This establishes the fundamental role of two-layered (superposition) coding
for the CC WTC.
The necessity of two auxiliaries to achieve the secrecy-capacity of CC WTCs is surprising. This is evident from
the fact that non-exact expressions for it have been used in recent works [36, Corollary 2], [46, Theorem 3.7].
The requirement of two auxiliaries is even more remarkable when one considers the recently established analogy
between WTC and Gelfand-Pinsker (GP) channels [14] without cost constraints. Indeed, for the GP channel, the
CC and the unconstrained capacities are given by the same expression up to adding the proper restriction to feasible
input distributions [47] [48, Claim 1] [49, Fact2]. To the best of our knowledge, the WTC is the only point-to-point
communication scenario for which the capacity formula itself changes due to the addition of an input cost constraint.
A. Background
The secrecy-capacity of a degraded WTC was established in [1], under the so-called weak-secrecy metric1.
The secrecy-capacity of the general WTC was proved in [2]. The main result of [2] in fact accounted for a
generalization of the WTC to the broadcast channel (BC) with confidential messages. The secrecy-capacity of the
latter is characterized using a pair of auxiliary random variables, and the direct proof uses superposition wiretap
coding. It was also shown therein that reducing the BC result to the WTC (by nullifying the common message)
and requiring perfect secrecy on the private message, one of the auxiliaries can be taken to be a constant2. This
gave rise to the secrecy-capacity formula given in (1).
Interestingly, this formula is quite robust to the security metric being used. In recent years, upgrading weak-secrecy
to more stringent metrics gained much popularity. Strong-secrecy removes the normalization by the blocklength from
the weak-secrecy metric, requiring that the information leakage itself vanishes [32], [33]. A further strengthening
to the semantic-security metric was introduced in [38]. While weak- and strong-secrecy both assume a uniform
distribution on the messages (i.e., security on average), semantic-security demands a vanishing information leakage
for all probability distributions over the message set (i.e., worst-case). Despite these increasingly stringent security
1Weak-secrecy refers a vanishing information leakage rate 1
n
I(M ;Zn) as the blocklength n→∞, where M is secret message and Zn is
the eavesdropper’s observation.
2Namely, U in [2, Corollary 2] can be taken to be a constant u∗, where u∗ = arg maxu∈U I(V ;Y |U = u)− I(V ;Z|U = u). However,
this argument cannot be applied in the CC WTC setting, as taking a constant U may violate the cost constraint.
3requirement, the secrecy-capacity with strong and semantic-security metrics remains unchanged [50, Theorem 17.11]
[38] compared to (1).
In practice, transmitted signals are often bound to cost (e.g., power) constraints. Therefore, various communication
scenarios originally explored without such constraints were later adapted to the CC case. This includes point-to-
point channels [51, Chapter 7], the GP channel [48] and the multiple-access channel [52, Problem 4.8], to name
a few. For all these aforementioned settings, the capacity under a CC is given by the same expression as in the
unconstrained case, but with an added restriction on the optimization domain. As will be shown herein, such a
simple adaptation of (1) to the CC case is not valid for the WTC.
B. Contributions
We consider a discrete and memoryless (DM) WTC with an input cost constraint and establish a single-letter
characterization of its secrecy-capacity. In contrast to (1), our characterization uses two auxiliary random variables.
We consider all three aforementioned security metrics, that is, weak-secrecy, strong-secrecy and semantic-security,
and show that the secrecy-capacity is the same for them all. This is done by proving achievability under semantic-
security (strongest among the three), while establishing the converse with respect to weak-secrecy.
The achievability proof uses a superposition wiretap code that carries the entire confidential message in its outer
layer. The inner layer encodes only random bits purposed to confuse the eavesdropper. The cost, reliability and
security analyses rely on standard random coding arguments. However, due to the presence of a positive cost
constraint, the expected value analysis (over the codebook ensemble) does not automatically imply the existence of
a deterministic codes sequence with the desired performance. We resolve this issue via a novel two-step expurgation
technique that first prunes ‘bad’ codebooks, and only then disposes of ‘bad’ messages. A careful analysis shows that
the inflicted rate loss is negligible, giving rise to a deterministic codebook that satisfies the desired cost, reliability
and security requirements.
We then turn to show that two-auxiliaries are necessary to achieve the CC WTC secrecy-capacity. This is done
by constructing an example for which superposition coding attains a strictly higher secrecy rate than standard
wiretap coding. The necessity of two auxiliaries can be understood by viewing the inner layer auxiliary as a “time-
sharing” variable that leaks no information about the message to the eavesdropper. In a time-shared scheme, the
cost constraint needs to be satisfied only on average (over the participating schemes). Thus, individual schemes
could possibly violate the cost constraint, and indeed, it may be beneficial to consider such schemes for achieving
higher secrecy rates. In particular, such a situation could occur if the mutual information term I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)
from the secrecy-capacity expression from (1) is a convex function over the CC optimization domain.
C. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides preliminary definitions and sets up the
operational problem. The main results are stated and discussed in Section III, while their proofs are furnished in
Section IV. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section V.
4II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SETUP
A. Notation
We use the following notation. N, R and R≥0 denotes the set of natural numbers, real numbers and non-negative
real numbers, respectively. For a, b ∈ R≥0, [a : b] := {n ∈ N : a ≤ n ≤ b}. Calligraphic letters, e.g., X ,
denote sets while |X | stands for its cardinality. For n ∈ N, Xn denotes the n-fold Cartesian product of X , and
xn = (x1, · · · , xn) denotes an element of Xn. Whenever the dimension n is clear from the context, bold-face
letters denotes vectors or sequences, e.g., x for xn. For i, j ∈ N such that i ≤ j, xji := (xi, xi+1, · · · , xj); the
subscript is omitted when i = 1.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, where Ω, F and P are the sample space, σ-algebra and probability measure,
respectively. Random variables over (Ω,F ,P) are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., X , with similar conventions
as above for random vectors. We use 1A for the indicator function of A ∈ F . The set of all probability mass
functions (PMFs) on a finite set X (always endowed with the power set σ-algebra) is denoted by P(X ).
The joint PMF of two discrete random variables X and Y on (Ω,F ,P) is denoted by PX,Y ; the corresponding
marginals are PX and PY . The conditional PMF of X given Y is represented by PX|Y . Expressions such as
PX,Y = PXPY |X are to be understood as pointwise equality, i.e., PX,Y (x, y) = PX(x)PY |X(y|x), for all (x, y) ∈
X × Y . When the joint distribution of a triple (X,Y, Z) factors as PX,Y,Z = PX,Y PZ|Y , these variable form a
Markov chain X−Y −Z. When X and Y are statistically independent, we write X ⊥ Y . If the entries of Xn are
drawn in an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) manner, i.e., if PXn(xn) =
∏n
i=1 PX(xi), ∀ xn ∈ Xn,
then the PMF PXn is denoted by P⊗nX . Similarly, if PY n|Xn(y
n|xn) = ∏ni=1 PY |X(yi|xi), then we write P⊗nY |X
for PY n|Xn . The conditional product PMF given a fixed xn ∈ Xn is designated by P⊗nY |X(·|xn).
For a discrete measurable space (X ,F), the probability measure induced by a PMF P ∈ P(X ) is denoted by
PP ; namely PP (A) =
∑
x∈A P (x), for all A ∈ F . The corresponding expectation is designated by EP . Similarly,
mutual information and entropy with an underlying PMF P are denoted as IP and HP , respectively. When the PMF
is clear from the context, the subscript is omitted. We use T (n)δ (P ) to denote the set of letter-typical sequences of
length n with respect to a PMF P ∈ P(X ) and a non-negative δ:
T (n)δ (P ) := {x ∈ Xn : |νx(x)− P (x)| ≤ δP (x), ∀x ∈ X} , (2)
where νx(x) := 1n
∑n
i=1 1{xi=x} is the empirical PMF of sequence x ∈ Xn. Finally, for a countable sample space
X and PMFs P,Q ∈ P(X ), the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between P and Q is
DKL (P‖Q) :=
∑
x∈X
P (x) log
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)
, (3)
and the total variation is
δTV (P,Q) :=
1
2
∑
x∈X
∣∣P (x)−Q(x)∣∣. (4)
5Encoder Decoder
Fig. 1: The CC WTC with transition kernel PY,Z|X . The encoder outputs X(m) for message M = m, and the
decoder and the eavesdropper observes Y and Z, respectively. The cost constraint E
[
Cn(X(m))
] ≤ b is imposed
for each message m ∈Mn.
B. Problem Setup
Let X , Y and Z be finite sets, b ≥ 0 and n ∈ N. Let C : X → R≥0 be a real-valued non-negative function. The
(X ,Y,Z, PY,Z|X ,C, b) CC DM-WTC (henceforth referred to as CC WTC) is shown in Fig. 1, where PY,Z|X : X →
P(Y ×Z) is the channel transition kernel, C is the cost function and b is the cost constraint. The encoder chooses
a message m ∈ Mn := [1 : 2nR], R ≥ 0, and maps it onto a channel input sequence x ∈ Xn. The codeword x
is transmitted over the n-fold WTC P⊗nY,Z|X , which outputs sequences y ∈ Yn and z ∈ Zn. The decoder observes
y, based on which it produces an estimate mˆ ∈ Mn of m. The eavesdropper observes z, from which it tries to
extract information about the transmitted message m.
Definition 1 (Code). An (n,R)-code cn for a CC WTC (X ,Y,Z, PY,Z|X ,C, b) with a message set Mn is a pair
of functions (fn, gn) such that
1) fn :Mn → P(Xn) is a stochastic encoder that satisfies the per-message cost constraint given by
E
[
Cn(X(m)
]
:=
∑
x∈Xn
fn(x|m)Cn(x) ≤ b, ∀ m ∈Mn, (5)
where, X(m) ∼ fn(·|m), and Cn(x) := 1n
∑n
i=1 C(xi), ∀ x ∈ Xn, is the n-fold extension of C;
2) gn : Yn →Mn is the decoding function.
Remark 2 (Minimal cost). The per-message constraint in (5) can be satisfied only if b ≥ cmin := min{C(x) : x ∈
X}. Henceforth, we will assume this condition holds without further mention.
A message PMF PM ∈ P(Mn) and a code cn = (fn, gn) induces a PMF on Mn × Xn × Yn × Zn ×Mn
given by
P (cn)(m,x,y, z, mˆ) = PM (m) fn(x|m) P⊗nY,Z|X(y, z|x) 1{mˆ=gn(y)} (6)
The performance of cn is evaluated in terms of the maximal decoding error probability and a chosen security metric.
Definition 3 (Error Probability). The maximal error probability of an (n,R)-code cn is
e(cn) := max
m∈Mn
em(cn), (7a)
6where for any m ∈Mn,
em(cn) := PP (cn)
(
Mˆ 6= m∣∣M = m) = ∑
x∈Xn
fn(x|m)
∑
y∈Yn:
gn(y)6=m
P⊗nY |X(y|x). (7b)
Definition 4 (Security metrics). For a given (n,R)-code cn and message PMF PM , the information leakage to
the eavesdropper is `(PM , cn) := IP (cn)(M ;Z). The weak-secrecy, strong-secrecy and semantic-security metrics
with respect to (w.r.t.) the code cn are, respectively, defined as
`weak(cn) :=
1
n
`(P¯M , cn) (8)
`str(cn) := `(P¯M , cn) (9)
`sem(cn) := max
PM∈P(Mn)
`(PM , cn), (10)
where P¯M denotes the uniform distribution on Mn.
Definition 5 (Achievability). A rate R ≥ 0 is said to be achievable with semantic-security for a CC WTC
(X ,Y,Z, PY,Z|X ,C, b) if for every  > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists an (n,R)-code cn such that (5) is
satisfied, and
max
{
e(cn), `sem(cn)
} ≤ . (11)
Achievability w.r.t. the weak- or strong-secrecy metrics is defined by replacing `sem with `weak or `str, respectively.
Definition 6 (Secrecy Capacity). The semantic-security capacity of a CC WTC (X ,Y,Z, PY,Z|X ,C, b), denoted
by Csem(PY,Z|X ,C, b), is the supremum of the set of all rates achievable with semantic-security. The strong-
secrecy capacity Cstr(PY,Z|X ,C, b) and weak-secrecy capacity Cweak(PY,Z|X ,C, b) are defined similarly w.r.t. the
corresponding notion of achievability.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We give a single-letter characterization of the weak-secrecy, strong-secrecy and semantic-security capacities of
the CC WTC, all of which are shown to be equal. The characterization involves two auxiliary random variables.
Both auxiliaries are necessary to achieve capacity in general. We first state the capacity result, and then provide an
example for which any single-auxiliary scheme is suboptimal.
A. Secrecy-capacity results
Let U and V be finite sets, and for any PU,V,X ∈ P(U × V × X ), set
C˜(PU,V,X , PY,Z|X) := IP (V ;Y |U)− IP (V ;Z|U), (12)
where the mutual information terms are taken w.r.t. P = PU,V,XPY,Z|X . Also, let
H(C, b) := {PU,V,X ∈ P(U × V × X ) : PU,V,X = PU,V PX|V , EP [C(X)] ≤ b} , (13)
7and define
C¯(PY,Z|X ,C, b) := sup
PU,V,X∈H(C,b)
C˜(PY,Z|X , PU,V,X). (14)
Our main result is given next. For simplicity of presentation, we will suppress PY,Z|X and C from the nota-
tion Csem(PY,Z|X ,C, b), Cstr(PY,Z|X ,C, b), Cweak(PY,Z|X ,C, b), C˜(PY,Z|X , PU,V,X), H(C, b) and C¯(PY,Z|X ,C, b),
henceforth denoting them by Csem(b), Cstr(b), Cweak(b), C˜(PU,V,X), H(b) and C¯(b), respectively.
Theorem 7 (Secrecy-capacity). The secrecy-capacity of a CC WTC (X ,Y,Z, PY,Z|X ,C, b) under weak-secrecy,
strong-secrecy and semantic-security is the same, and is given by
Csem(b) = Cstr(b) = Cweak(b) = C¯(b). (15)
The proof of Theorem 7 is given in Section IV-A. The achievability of (15) relies on a superposition wiretap
coding, while the converse adapts the classic WTC converse to accommodate the cost constraint. We note that the
CC WTC’s secrecy-capacity expression involves two auxiliary random variables U and V . In contrast, the secrecy-
capacity formula of a WTC (without a cost constraint), given in (1), uses only a single auxiliary. In Section III-B
we show that a reduction of C¯(b) to a single auxiliary is impossible, in general.
The following lemma provides additional properties of C¯(b). These properties are used in the proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 8 (Structural properties). In the definition of C¯(b) in (14), it suffices to consider auxiliary alphabets U
and V with |U| ≤ |X | and |V| ≤ |X |2. Moreover, C¯(b) is a non-decreasing and concave (for b ≥ cmin) function of
b, and the supremum in (14) is achieved, i.e.,
C¯(b) = max
PU,V,X∈H(b)
C˜(PU,V,X) := max
PU,V,X∈H(b)
IP (V ;Y |U)− IP (V ;Z|U). (16)
The proof of Lemma 8 is provided in Appendix A for completeness.
B. Two Auxiliaries are Necessary
Comparing (1) and (16), one might ask whether a reduction to a single auxiliary random variable in Theorem
7 is possible. We show that the answer is negative in general. To this end, we provide an example of a CC WTC
PY,Z|X , for which
max
PU,V,X∈H(b)
IP (V ;Y |U)− IP (V ;Z|U) > max
PV,X :
EP [C(X)]≤b
IP (V ;Y )− IP (V ;Z), (17)
where the mutual information terms on the right hand side (RHS) are w.r.t. PV,XPY,Z|X . To explain briefly, the
example incorporates a WTC setup in which the transmitter (encoder) is connected to the receiver (decoder) via a
noiseless private data link. The transmitter can choose the content as well as timing of the transmission, however, it
is constrained to use the link atmost half of the time. The receiver observes the data (error-free) when transmission
occurs, and random noise otherwise. On the other hand, the eavesdropper has no access to the data link, but perfectly
knows the timing of the transmission. We next describe the details of the WTC setup.
Consider the (X ,Y,Z, PY,Z|X ,C, b) CC WTC shown in Fig. 2 that is defined as follows:
8Fig. 2: The CC WTC with transition kernel PY,Z|X used in Proposition 9. The encoder outputs X = (X˜, Z˜) such
that the cost constraint 1n
∑n
i=1 E(Z˜i) ≤ 0.5 is satisfied. The eavesdropper’s observation Z = Z˜ is controlled by
the encoder, and the realization of Z˜i decides whether the decoder observes X˜i (when Z˜i = 1) or noise Ni (when
Z˜i = 0).
• Let X˜ = Y = Z = {0, 1}, and X = X˜ × Z .
• The channel input is X = (X˜, Z˜) ∼ PX˜,Z˜ , where X˜ and Z˜ take values in X˜ and Z , respectively, and both
are controlled by the encoder.
• Consider the cost function C(x) = C(x˜, z˜) = z˜, for all x = (x˜, z˜) ∈ X˜ × Z , and set the cost constraint to
b = 0.5. Thus, the input must satisfy
E
[
C(X)
]
= E
[
Z˜
] ≤ 1
2
.
• Let N ∼ Ber(0.5) be independent of X = (X˜, Z˜) and set
Y = X˜Z˜ +N(1− Z˜).
Let PY |X = PY |X˜,Z˜ denote the transition kernel from X to Y induced by the above relation.
• The WTC PY,Z|X is given by PY,Z|X˜,Z˜ = PY |X˜,Z˜1{Z=Z˜}.
We have the following proposition whose proof is given in Section IV-B.
Proposition 9. For the (X ,Y,Z, PY,Z|X ,C, 0.5) CC WTC described above,
C¯(0.5) := max
PU,V,X∈H(0.5)
IP (V ;Y |U)− IP (V ;Z|U) ≥ 0.5 > max
PV,X :
EP [C(X)]≤0.5
IP (V ;Y )− IP (V ;Z). (18)
For proving Proposition 9, we choose a PU,V,X ∈ H(0.5) such that IP (V ;Y |U) − IP (V ;Z|U) = 0.5, thus
establishing C¯(0.5) ≥ 0.5. This is done by selecting U = Z˜ ∼ Ber(0.5), X˜ ∼ Ber(0.5) ⊥ Z˜, and V =
X := (X˜, Z˜). Intuitively, such a choice of auxiliaries correspond to a communication scheme of transmitting
data half of the time (say, every alternate channel use). Subsequently, we show that the RHS of (18) is strictly
below 0.5. This is shown by starting with the assumption that there exists a PV,X such that EP [C(X)] ≤ 0.5 and
IP (V ;Y )− IP (V ;Z) ≥ 0.5, and then arguing that it leads to a contradiction.
Achieving the CC WTC secrecy-capacity in the above example requires two auxiliary random variables. While a
reduction in the number of auxiliaries is impossible in general, we next show that no auxiliaries are needed when
the WTC is less noisy. Namely, the condition is that Y is less noisy than Z, i.e., IP (U ;Y ) ≥ IP (U ;Z), for all
9PU,X,Y,Z = PU,XPY,Z|X [53]. This is similar to the state of affairs for WTC without a cost constraint [2].
Corollary 10. If Y is less noisy than Z, then
C¯(b) = max
PX : EP [C(X)]≤b
IP (X;Y )− IP (X;Z). (19)
If Z is less noisy than Y , then C¯(b) = 0.
The proof of Corollary 10 is provided in Section IV-C.
IV. PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 7
We will show that Cweak(b) ≤ C¯(b) and Csem(b) ≥ C¯(b) for any b ≥ 0. This combined with the fact that
Csem(b) ≤ Cstr(b) ≤ Cweak(b) will imply the desired result.
1) Converse: Recall that P¯M denotes the uniform distribution on Mn. It suffices to show that for any δ > 0,
a rate R achievable under the weak-secrecy metric satisfies R ≤ C¯(b) + δ, for large enough n. Fix  > 0 and
let cn be an (n,R)-code with max
{
e(cn), `weak(cn)
} ≤ . Any such code must also satisfy the weaker constraint
max
{
EP¯M
[
eM (cn)
]
, 1n`(P¯M , cn)
} ≤ . Accordingly, we may assume without loss of generality that PM = P¯M .
From Fano’s inequality [54], it follows that
H(M |Y) ≤ 1 + nR. (20)
Now, we can write
nR
= H(M)
(a)
≤ I(M ;Y) + 1 + nR
(b)
≤ I(M ;Y)− I(M ;Z) + 1 + nR+ n
=
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Yi|Y i−1)− I(M ;Zi|Zni+1) + 1 + n(R+ 1)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Yi|Y i−1)− I(M ;Zi|Zni+1) + I(Zni+1;Yi|M,Y i−1)− I(Y i−1;Zi|M,Zni+1) + 1 + n(R+ 1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M,Zni+1;Yi|Y i−1)− I(M,Y i−1;Zi|Zni+1) + 1 + n(R+ 1)
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Yi|Y i−1, Zni+1)− I(M ;Zi|Y i−1, Zni+1) + 1 + n(R+ 1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M,Y i−1, Zni+1;Yi|Y i−1, Zni+1)− I(M,Y i−1, Zni+1;Zi|Y i−1, Zni+1) + 1 + n(R+ 1)
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(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui) + 1 + n(R+ 1)
(f)
≤
n∑
i=1
C¯
(
E
[
C(Xi)
])
+ 1 + n(R+ 1)
(g)
≤ nC¯
(
n∑
i=1
1
n
E
[
C(Xi)
])
+ 1 + n(R+ 1)
(h)
= n
(
C¯(b) + (R+ 1) +
1
n
)
,
where
(a) follows from (20);
(b) is because l(P¯M , cn) ≤ n;
(c) and (d) use the Csisza´r-sum identity [52];
(e) is due to the auxiliary random variable identification Ui = (Y i−1, Zni+1) and Vi = (M,Y
i−1, Zni+1);
(f) follows from the definition of C¯(·) in (14) since Ui − Vi −Xi − (Yi, Zi) form a Markov chain with the above
auxiliary variable identification;
(g) is due to the concavity of C¯(·) proved in Lemma 8;
(h) is because C¯(·) is non-decreasing and Xn satisfies E
[
1
n
∑n
i=1 C(Xi)
]
≤ b due to (5).
Thus,
R ≤ C¯(b) + +
1
n
1−  .
The claim follows by taking n sufficiently large and  > 0 small enough.
2) Achievability: By the continuity3 of C¯(b), it suffices to show that for any  > 0, there exists an (n,R) code
cn that satisfies (11), provided that R < C¯(b) and n is sufficiently large. To this end, we construct an ensemble of
superposition wiretap codes and show that the expected (over the ensemble) cost, error probability and semantic-
security metric satisfy average versions of the constraints. Then, through a sequence of codebook and message
expurgation steps, we show the existence of a code cn that satisfies (5) and (11), as required.
Fix  > 0 and a joint PMF PU,V,X,Y,Z := PU,V PX|V PY,Z|X ∈ P(U ×V×X ×Y×Z) such that EP
[
C(X)
]
< b.
Codebook Bn: We use a superposition codebook such that the inner layer adds redundancy to confuse the
eavesdropper, while the outer layer carries the information about the message.
Define the index sets In := [1 : 2nR1 ] and Jn := [1 : 2nR2 ]. Let B(n)U := {U(i), i ∈ In} be a random inner layer
codebook such that each codeword U(i), i ∈ In, is a sequence of length n generated independently according to
P⊗nU . Denote a realization of B
(n)
U by B(n)U := {u(i), i ∈ In}.
For a fixed B(n)U and each i ∈ In, let B(n)V (i) := {V(i, j,m), (j,m) ∈ Jn×Mn} denote a collection of n-length
random sequences, each generated independently according to P⊗nV |U
( · ∣∣u(i)). Denote a realization of B(n)V (i) by
B(n)V (i) := {v(i, j,m), (j,m) ∈ Jn ×Mn}. Also, set B(n)V := {B(n)V (i), i ∈ In}, and denote its possible outcome
3This follows from the concavity of C¯(b); see Lemma 8.
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by B(n)V . With the above, the random superposition codebook is given by Bn := {B(n)U ,B(n)V }, and its realization is
denoted by Bn.
Denoting the set of all possible values of Bn by Bn, the codebook construction described above induces a PMF
µ ∈ P(Bn), given by
µ(Bn) := µ
(
B(n)U ,B(n)V
)
:=
∏
i∈In
P⊗nU (u(i)) ∏
(j,m)∈Jn×Mn
P⊗nV |U
(
v(i, j,m)
∣∣u(i))
 .
Encoder fn: Given a codebook Bn and message M = m, the encoder chooses an index pair (i, j) uniformly at
random from the set In×Jn, and transmits X ∼ P⊗nX|V
( · ∣∣v(i, j,m)). The induced encoding function fn :Mn →
P(Xn) is given
fn(x|m) = 1|In||Jn|
∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
P⊗nX|V
(
x
∣∣v(i, j,m)), ∀ (m,x) ∈Mn ×Xn. (21)
Decoder gn: Upon observing y ∈ Yn, the decoder looks for a unique tuple
(ˆ
i, jˆ, mˆ
) ∈ In×Jn×Mn such that(
u
(ˆ
i),v(ˆi, jˆ, mˆ
)
,y
)
∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y ), for some δ > 0. If such a unique tuple exists, the decoder sets gn(y) = mˆ;
else, gn(y) = 1.
Induced distribution: Denote the pair (fn, gn) w.r.t. the codebook Bn by cn(Bn). For a given codebook Bn,
cn(Bn) induces a joint PMF P (Bn)M,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ ∈ P(Mn×In×Jn×Un×Vn×Xn×Yn×Zn×Mn), given
by
P
(Bn)
M,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
(m, i, j,u,v,x,y, z, mˆ)
= P¯M (m)
1
|In||Jn|1{u=u(i),v=v(i,j,m)}P
⊗n
X|V (x|v)P⊗nY Z|X(y, z|x)1{mˆ=gn(y)}. (22)
Henceforth, we use P (Bn) and P (Bn) as shorthands for P (Bn)
M,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
and P (Bn)
M,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
, respectively.
We will also denote the probability measure induced by P (Bn) and P (Bn) by PP (Bn) and PP (Bn) , respectively. Note
that P (Bn) is a random PMF and PP (Bn) is a random probability measure.
Cost Analysis: We analyze the expectation (w.r.t. the random codebook) of the cost averaged over messages.
For any m ∈Mn, note that Eµ
[
P
(Bn)
X|M (x|m)
]
= P⊗nX (x), ∀ x ∈ Xn, which readily implies that
Eµ
[
E
P
(Bn)
X|M (·|m)
[
Cn(X)
]]
= EP⊗nX
[
Cn(X)
]
= EPX
[
C(X)
]
< b.
It follows that for some γ′ > 0 and all n ∈ N,
Eµ
[
E
P
(Bn)
X
[
Cn(X)
]] ≤ b− γ′. (23)
Average error probability analysis: We analyze the expected error probability averaged over messages. For any
Bn ∈ Bn and (i, j,m) ∈ In × Jn ×Mn, let Y ∼ P (Bn)Y|I,J,M (·|i, j,m), and define the following error events:
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E1(i, j,m) :=
{(
u(i),v(i, j,m),Y
)
/∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )
}
E2(i, j,m) :=
{
∃(j′,m′) ∈ Jn ×Mn,
(
j′,m′
) 6= (j,m) : (u(i),v(i, j′,m′),Y) ∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )}
E3(i, j,m) :=
{
∃(i′, j′,m′) ∈ In×Jn×Mn, i′ 6= i : (u(i′),v(i′, j′,m′),Y) ∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )}.
Due to the symmetry of the random codebook Bn, encoder fn and decoder gn, the expected error probability over
Bn, i.e., Eµ
[
PP (Bn)(Mˆ 6= M)
]
, is the same for any realization of (I, J,M). Thus, we may assume without loss of
generality that (I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1). We have
Eµ
[
PP (Bn)(Mˆ 6= M)
]
= Eµ
[
PP (Bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M ∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))]
≤ Eµ
[
PP (Bn)
(E1(1, 1, 1) ∪ E2(1, 1, 1) ∪ E3(1, 1, 1)∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))]. (24)
To upper bound the the RHS of (24), we use the following lemma whose proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 11. If (R,R1, R2) ∈ R3≥0 satisfy
R2 +R < IP (V ;Y |U) (25)
R1 +R2 +R < IP (U, V ;Y ), (26)
then there exists a ζ(δ) > 0 such that
Eµ
[
PP (Bn)
(E1(1, 1, 1) ∪ E2(1, 1, 1) ∪ E3(1, 1, 1)∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))] ≤ e−nζ(δ). (27)
Thus, from (24) and (27), it follows that
Eµ
[
PP (Bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M)] ≤ e−nζ(δ) −−→
n
0, (28)
provided (25) and (26) holds.
Security analysis: First consider
IP (Bn)(M ;Z) ≤ IP (Bn)(M ; I,U,Z)
= DKL
(
P
(Bn)
M,I,U,Z
∥∥∥P (Bn)M P (Bn)I,U,Z)
= DKL
(
P
(Bn)
M,I,U,Z
∥∥∥P (Bn)M,I,UP (Bn)Z|I,U)
(a)
= DKL
(
P
(Bn)
M,I,UP
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U
∥∥∥P (Bn)M,I,UP⊗nZ|U)− DKL (P (Bn)I,U,Z∥∥∥P (Bn)I,U P⊗nZ|U)
(b)
≤ DKL
(
P
(Bn)
M,I,UP
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U
∥∥∥P (Bn)M,I,UP⊗nZ|U) (29a)
(c)
≤ max
m∈Mn
DKL
(
P
(Bn)
I,U P
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U(·|m, ·, ·)
∥∥∥P (Bn)I,U P⊗nZ|U) , (29b)
where,
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(a) and (c) is since M ⊥ (I,U);
(b) uses the non-negativity of KL divergence.
Maximizing w.r.t. PM ∈ P(Mn) on both sides of (29b), we obtain that
max
PM∈P(Mn)
IP (Bn)(M ;Z) ≤ max
m∈Mn
DKL
(
P
(Bn)
I,U P
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U(·|m, ·, ·)
∥∥∥P (Bn)I,U P⊗nZ|U) . (30)
Note that P (Bn)I,U P
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U(·|m, ·, ·)  P (Bn)I,U P⊗nZ|U , where  denotes absolute continuity of measures. For PMFs
P,Q with a finite support such that P  Q, DKL (P‖Q) can be upper bounded by the total variation distance
δTV (P,Q) [55, Equation 30]. Defining
θ(m,Bn) := δTV
(
P
(Bn)
I,U P
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U(·|m, ·, ·), P (Bn)I,U P⊗nZ|U
)
,
and applying [13, Lemma 9], we obtain
max
m∈Mn
DKL
(
P
(Bn)
I,U P
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U(·|m, ·, ·)
∥∥∥P (Bn)I,U P⊗nZ|U)
≤ max
m∈Mn
θ(m,Bn)
(
n log |Z| − log θ(m,Bn) + n logP (min)Z|U
)
, (31)
where
P
(min)
Z|U := min{PZ|U (z|u), (z, u) ∈ Z × U : PZ|U (z|u) > 0}.
Thus, showing that there exist Bn ∈ Bn and γ1 > 0 such that maxm∈Mn θ(m,Bn) ≤ e−nγ1 for large enough n,
is sufficient (by (30) and (31)) to get
max
PM∈P(Mn)
IP (Bn)(M ;Z) −−→
n
0.
The existence of such a Bn is implied by the following lemma. The lemma restates the outcome of the secrecy
analysis from [13], providing a double-exponential bound on the probability of an exponentially small deviation of
maxm∈Mn θ(m,Bn) from zero.
Lemma 12 ( Lemma 4 from [13]). If
R2 > IP (V ;Z|U), (32)
then there exists γ1, γ2 > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n,
Pµ
(
max
m∈Mn
θ(m,Bn) > e−nγ1
)
≤ e−enγ2 . (33)
Lemma 12 follows from the proof of Lemma 4 in [13], which is a stronger version of the superposition soft-
covering lemma [55]. The double-exponential bound in (33) is an implication of Chernoff bound applied to the
collection of an exponential number of i.i.d. codewords in the random superposition codebook.
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Summary of random coding argument: Combining (23), (28) and (33), we have shown that
Eµ
[
E
P
(Bn)
X
[
Cn(X)
]] ≤ b′ := b− γ′, (34a)
Eµ
[
PP (Bn)(Mˆ 6= M)
]
≤ e−nζ(δ), (34b)
Eµ
[
1{maxm∈Mn θ(m,Bn)>e−nγ1}
]
≤ e−enγ2 , (34c)
provided (25), (26) and (32) holds.
We next perform a sequence of expurgation steps: first, w.r.t. codebooks and then w.r.t. messages. At the end of
this process, we deduce the existence of a single codebook Bn that satisfies (5) and (11). Note that the selection
lemma of [56] or [13] is not applicable here as the RHS of (34a) is a constant which does not vanish to zero as
required by the lemma.
Expurgation: For any B′n ⊆ Bn, let
µ¯(B′n) :=
∑
Bn∈B′n
µ(Bn) (35)
be the probability measure onBn induced by µ. Our expurgation technique on the codebooks Bn ∈ Bn is performed
for each fixed n (sufficiently large) as described in the following steps:
1) Codebook expurgation to satisfy average (over messages) cost:
Expurgate codebooks Bn ∈ Bn with the highest cost EP (Bn)X
[
Cn(X)
]
to obtain a set B′n ⊂ Bn such that
1
n+2 ≤ µ¯(B′n) < 1n+1 . This is possible for large n since each codebook Bn has exponentially small probability.
We now show that all the codebooks Bn ∈ B′n satisfy EP (Bn)X
[
Cn(X)
] ≤ n+1n b′. Assume otherwise that there
exists B∗n ∈ B′n such that EP (B∗n)X
[
Cn(X)
]
> n+1n b
′. Then, we can write
Eµ
[
E
P
(Bn)
X
[
Cn(X)
]]
=
∑
Bn∈Bn
µ(Bn)EP (Bn)X
[
Cn(X)
]
≥
∑
Bn∈Bn\B′n
µ(Bn)EP (Bn)X
[
Cn(X)
]
(a)
≥
∑
Bn∈Bn\B′n
µ(Bn)EP (B∗n)X
[
Cn(X)
]
>
∑
Bn∈Bn\B′n
µ(Bn)n+ 1
n
b′
(b)
≥ n
n+ 1
n+ 1
n
b′ = b′, (36)
where
(a) is because by the expurgation procedure, E
P
(Bn)
X
[
Cn(X)
] ≥ E
P
(B∗n)
X
[
Cn(X)
]
for every Bn ∈ Bn \B′n ;
(b) is since µ¯(Bn \B′n) ≥ nn+1 .
Eqn. (36) contradicts (34a), and hence E
P
(Bn)
X
[
Cn(X)
] ≤ n+1n b′ should hold for all Bn ∈ B′n.
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Define a PMF µ1 ∈ P(Bn) and its induced probability measure µ¯1 on Bn by
µ1(Bn) :=

µ(Bn)
µ¯(B′n)
, if Bn ∈ B′n,
0, otherwise,
and
µ¯1(B˜n) :=
∑
Bn∈B˜n
µ1(Bn), B˜n ⊆ Bn,
respectively. Then, we have
E
P
(Bn)
X
[
Cn(X)
] ≤ n+ 1
n
b′, ∀ Bn ∈ B′n,
Eµ1
[
PP (Bn)(Mˆ 6= M)
] ≤ 1
µ¯(B′n)
Eµ
[
PP (Bn)(Mˆ 6= M)
] ≤ e−nζ(δ)
µ¯(B′n)
≤ (n+ 2)e−nζ(δ),
Eµ1
[
1{maxm∈Mn θ(m,Bn)>e−nγ1}
]
≤ 1
µ¯(B′n)
Eµ
[
1{maxm∈Mn θ(m,Bn)>e−nγ1}
]
≤ e
−enγ2
µ¯(B′n)
≤ (n+ 2)e−enγ2 ,
2) Codebook expurgation to satisfy average cost, average error probability and semantic-security:
Expurgate codebooks Bn ∈ B′n with the highest average error probability to obtain a set B′′n ⊂ B′n such that
1
3 ≤ µ¯1(B′′n) < 12 . Then, it follows similarly to step 1 that
PP (Bn)(Mˆ 6= M) ≤ 2(n+ 2)e−nζ(δ), ∀ Bn ∈ B′′n.
Define another PMF µ2 ∈ P(Bn) by
µ2(Bn) :=

µ1(Bn)
µ¯1(B′′n)
, if Bn ∈ B′′n,
0, otherwise.
Then, we have
E
P
(Bn)
X
[
Cn(X)
] ≤ n+ 1
n
b′, ∀ Bn ∈ B′′n,
PP (Bn)(Mˆ 6= M) ≤ 2(n+ 2)e−nζ(δ), ∀ Bn ∈ B′′n,
Eµ2
[
1{maxm∈Mn θ(m,Bn)>e−nγ1}
]
≤ 3(n+ 2)e−enγ2 .
Perform one more expurgation step similar to the previous step to obtain a non-empty set of codebooks B′′′n
such that for each codebook Bn ∈ B′′′n and sufficiently large n,
E
P
(Bn)
X
[
Cn(X)
] ≤ n+ 1
n
b′, ∀ Bn ∈ B′′′n , (37)
PP (Bn)(Mˆ 6= M) ≤ 2(n+ 2)e−nζ(δ), ∀ Bn ∈ B′′′n , (38)
max
m∈Mn
θ(m,Bn) ≤ e−nγ1 , ∀ Bn ∈ B′′′n . (39)
3) Message expurgation to satisfy per-message cost, maximal error probability and semantic-security:
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Now, fixing a codebook Bn ∈ B′′′n , perform expurgation on the set of messagesMn to obtain upper bounds on
the per-message cost and maximal error probability, in place of the average (over messages) cost and average
(over messages) error probability given in (37) and (38), respectively. Let α ∈ [ 1n+2 , 1n+1 ). Similar to step 1, by
expurgating a (1−α) fraction of the messages m ∈Mn with the highest cost EP (Bn)
X|M (·|m)
[
Cn(X)
]
to obtain a
setM′n ⊂Mn, and defining for all (m, i, j,u,v,x,y, z, mˆ) ∈Mn×In×Jn×Un×Vn×Xn×Yn×Zn×Mˆn,
a PMF P˜ (Bn) given by
P˜
(Bn)
M,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
(m, i, j,u,v,x,y, z, mˆ)
:=

|Mn|
|M′n|P
(Bn)
M,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
(m, i, j,u,v,x,y, z, mˆ), if m ∈M′n,
0, otherwise,
(40)
it follows that
E
P˜
(Bn)
X|M (·|m)
[
Cn(X)
] ≤ (n+ 1)2
n2
b′, ∀ m ∈M′n,
PP˜ (Bn)(Mˆ 6= M) ≤ 2(n+ 2)2e−nζ(δ),
max
m∈M′n
θ(m,Bn) ≤ e−nγ1 .
Finally, for β ∈ [ 13 , 12 ), expurgating a 1−β fraction of the messages m ∈M′n with the highest error probability
PP˜ (Bn)(Mˆ 6= m|M = m) and denoting the resulting set by M′′n (M′′n ⊂ M′n), it follows similar to step 3
that
E
P˜
(Bn)
X|M (·|m)
[
Cn(X)
] ≤ (n+ 1)2
n2
b′, ∀ m ∈M′′n,
P
P˜
(Bn)
Mˆ|M (·|m)
(Mˆ 6= m) ≤ 4(n+ 2)2e−nζ(δ), ∀ m ∈M′′n,
max
m∈M′′n
θ(m,Bn) ≤ e−nγ1 .
Summary of expurgation steps:
Note that |M′′n| = βα|Mn| ≥ e
nR
3(n+2) . Thus, for sufficiently large n, we have shown the existence of a
codebook Bn and a (n,R− 1n log(3n+ 6)) code cn(Bn) = (fn, gn) with message set M′′n, such that
E
[
Cn(X(m)
] ≤ (n+ 1)2
n2
b′ = b− γ′ + 2n+ 1
n2
(b− γ′) < b, ∀ m ∈M′′n, (41)
and
max
{
max
m∈M′′n
em (cn(Bn)) , max
PM∈P(M′′n)
` (PM , cn(Bn))
}
≤ ,
provided (25), (26) and (32) holds.
Eliminating R1 and R2 from (25), (26) and (32) via the Fourier-Motzkin elimination yields R < IP (V ;Y |Z)−
IP (V ;Z|U). The proof is completed by noting that Csem(b) is a closed set by definition, and IP (V ;Y |Z)−
IP (V ;Z|U) is a continuous function of P .
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Remark 13. Theorem 7 states the invariance of CC WTC secrecy-capacity to the employed secrecy metric.
The converse proof further shows that capacity remains unchanged if the maximal error probability and/or per
message cost constraints are relaxed to average (over messages) constraints of the form EP¯M
[
eM (cn)
] ≤  and
EP¯M
[
Cn(X(M))
] ≤ b, respectively.
B. Proof of Proposition 9
Since the WTC transition kernel is PY,Z|X˜Z˜ = PY |X˜,Z˜1{Z=Z˜}, Z = Z˜ with probability one. We henceforth
identify Z and Z˜. We start by showing that
max
PU,V,X∈H(0.5)
IP (V ;Y |U)− IP (V ;Z|U) ≥ 0.5. (42)
Set U = Z˜ ∼ Ber(0.5), X˜ ∼ Ber(0.5), X˜ ⊥ Z˜, and V = X = (X˜, Z˜). This choice satisfies PU,V,X ∈ H(0.5),
since U − V −X = (X˜, Z˜)− (Y, Z˜) and EP
[
C(X)
]
:= EP
[
Z˜
]
= 0.5. Moreover,
IP (V ;Y |U)− IP (V ; Z˜|U) = IP (X;Y |Z˜)− IP (X; Z˜|Z˜)
= IP (X;Y |Z˜)
= 0.5, (43)
where (43) is because IP (X;Y |Z˜) = PZ˜(1)H(X˜) = 0.5. Hence, (42) holds.
Next, we establish that
max
PV,X :
EP [C(X)]≤0.5
IP (V ;Y )− IP (V ; Z˜) < 0.5. (44)
For any PV,X = PV,X˜,Z˜ such that EP
[
Z˜
] ≤ 0.5, we have the following chain of inequalities4:
I(V ;Y )− I(V ; Z˜) = I(X˜, Z˜, V ;Y )− I(X˜, Z˜;Y |V )− I(V ; Z˜)
(a)
= I(X˜, Z˜;Y )− I(X˜, Z˜;Y |V )− I(V ; Z˜)
= I(X˜;Y |Z˜)− I(X˜;Y |Z˜, V )− I(V ; Z˜|Y )
(b)
= PZ˜(0)I(X˜;N |Z˜ = 0) + PZ˜(1)I(Y ;Y |Z˜ = 1)− I(X˜;Y |Z˜, V )− I(V ; Z˜|Y )
(c)
= PZ˜(1)H(Y |Z˜ = 1)− I(X˜;Y |Z˜, V )− I(V ; Z˜|Y )
(d)
≤ 0.5H(Y |Z˜ = 1)− I(X˜;Y |Z˜, V )− I(V ; Z˜|Y ) (45)
(e)
≤ 0.5, (46)
where,
(a) is due to the Markov chain V − (X˜, Z˜)− (Y, Z˜);
(b) follows from the definition of Y ;
4We omit the subscript P in the subsequent mutual information and entropy terms as the PMF is P = PV,XPY,Z˜|X throughout.
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(c) is because N ⊥ (X˜, Z˜);
(d) uses the cost constraint E
[
Z˜
] ≤ 0.5;
(e) is by the non-negativity of mutual information and since Y is binary.
Thus,
max
PV,X :
E[C(X)]≤0.5
I(V ;Y )− I(V ; Z˜) ≤ 0.5. (47)
Consequently, (44) is violated only if there exists some X = (X˜, Z˜) and a joint PMF PV,X,Y,Z˜ = PV,XPY,Z˜|X
such that E
[
Z˜
] ≤ 0.5, and the inequalities in (45) and (46) hold with equality, i.e.,
I(V ;Y )− I(V ; Z˜) = 0.5. (48)
For this to be possible, the following conditions must hold:
1) PZ˜(1) = 0.5;
2) H(Y |Z˜ = 1) = 1 which means that given Z˜ = 1, Y ∼ Ber(0.5);
3) I(X˜;Y |Z˜, V ) = 0 which implies that X˜ − (Z˜, V )− Y forms a Markov chain;
4) I(V ; Z˜|Y ) = 0 which implies that V − Y − Z˜ forms a Markov chain.
Now, notice that PY |Z˜=0 = PY |Z˜=1 = Ber(0.5). Hence, Y ⊥ Z˜, which further implies via Condition (4) that
(V, Y ) ⊥ Z˜. Finally,
I(V ;Y |Z˜ = 1) ≥ I(X˜;Y |Z˜ = 1) = H(Y |Z˜ = 1) = 1. (49)
The inequality in (49) is due to Condition (3) above, while the last equality is due to Condition (2). Since Y is
binary, I(V ;Y |Z˜ = 1) ≤ 1, and therefore the inequality in (49) is an equality.
To conclude, observe that (V, Y ) ⊥ Z˜ (shown above) implies that
I(V ;Y )− I(V ; Z˜) = I(V ;Y |Z˜ = 1)− 0 = 1. (50)
However, I(V ;Y )− I(V ; Z˜) ≤ 0.5 from (46). This leads to a contradiction, and so (48) is invalid. Via (47), this
implies that (44) holds. Combining (44) with (42) proves Proposition 9.
C. Proof of Corollary 10
Fix PU,V,X,Y,Z = PU,V PX|V PY,Z|X , where Y is less noisy than Z. We have
IP (V ;Y |U)− IP (V ;Z|U)
(a)
= IP (V ;Y )− IP (V ;Z)− (IP (U ;Y )− IP (U ;Z))
(b)
= IP (X;Y )− IP (X;Z)− (IP (X;Y |V )− IP (X;Z|V ))− (IP (U ;Y )− IP (U ;Z))
(c)
≤ IP (X;Y )− IP (X;Z),
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where, (a) and (b) are due to the Markov chain U − V −X − (Y,Z) that holds under PMF PU,V,X,Y,Z ; and (c) is
due to the less noisy assumption which implies that IP (U ;Y )−IP (U ;Z) ≥ 0 and IP (X;Y |V )−IP (X;Z|V ) ≥ 0
(due to V −X − (Y, Z) under PU,V,X,Y,Z).
Thus, it follows that
C¯(b) ≤ max
PX :EP [C(X)]≤b
IP (X;Y )− IP (X;Z). (51)
The reverse inequality follows trivially by selecting V = X and U = ∅ in (16), thus proving (19).
If Z is less noisy than Y , then IP (V ;Y |U)− IP (V ;Z|U) ≤ 0 for any PU,V,X,Y,Z = PU,V PX|V PY,Z|X which
gives C¯(b) = 0, due to its non-negativity.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper revisited the classical WTC setting with a cost constraint, and showed that achieving its secrecy-
capacity generally requires two-layer coding. To do so, we proved optimality of superposition wiretap coding
under cost constraint, and provided a WTC example for which single-layer coding is strictly suboptimal. This
stands in contrast to the classic WTC secrecy-capacity result without a cost constraint, that is characterized using a
single auxiliary random variable. In many other communication scenarios, imposing a cost constraint on the input
amounts to a simple adaptation of the unconstrained case capacity; namely, restricting the optimization to those input
distributions that satisfy the constraint in expectation. Our result provides an example where this commonly observed
behavior does not hold, and a second auxiliary must be introduced as a result of the added cost constraint. Our
main goal was to highlight this important fact and put forth the correct CC WTC secrecy-capacity characterization,
for which non-exact expressions exist in the literature.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
The proof of the cardinality bounds |U| ≤ |X | and |V| ≤ |X |2 follows via a standard application of the Eggleston-
Fenchel-Carathe´odory Theorem [57, Theorem 18], and is omitted.
Given that |U| and |V| are finite, the set H(b) is non-empty (whenever b ≥ cmin) and compact. Since C¯(b) is
the supremum of a continuous function I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U) of PU,V,X over H(b), the supremum is achieved
and thus a maximum exists. The fact that C¯(b) is monotonic and non-decreasing in b follows by its definition.
Finally, to show the concavity of C¯(b) for b ≥ cmin, consider the following. For i = 0, 1, let bi ≥ cmin and
PUi,Vi,Xi,Yi,Zi ∈ P(U × V × X × Y × Z) be a PMF for which
PUi,Vi,Xi ∈ H(bi), (52)
PUi,Vi,Xi,Yi,Zi := PUi,Vi,XiPYi,Zi|Xi := PUi,Vi,XiPY,Z|X ,
C¯(bi) := IP (Vi;Yi|Ui)− IP (Vi;Zi|Ui). (53)
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Also, let τ ∈ [0, 1], Q ∼ Ber(τ) with Q = {0, 1}, Uτ := (UQ, Q), Vτ := (VQ, Q) and Xτ := XQ, and
PUτ ,Vτ ,Xτ ,Yτ ,Zτ ∈ P(Uτ × Vτ ×X × Y × Z) be a PMF defined by
PUτ ,Vτ ,Xτ ,Yτ ,Zτ := PUτ ,VτPXτ |VτPYτ ,Zτ |Xτ := PUτ ,VτPXτ |VτPY,Z|X . (54)
Note that Uτ − Vτ −Xτ − (Yτ , Zτ ) holds under PUτ ,Vτ ,Xτ ,Yτ ,Zτ , and PUτ ,Vτ ,Xτ ∈ H(τb0 + (1− τ)b1) since
EP (C(Xτ )) ≤ τb0 + (1− τ)b1. (55)
Then, we have
(1− τ)C¯(b0) + τC¯(b1) = (1− τ) (IP (V0;Y0|U0)− IP (V0;Z0|U0)) + τ (IP (V1;Y1|U1)− IP (V1;Z1|U1))
= IP (VQ, Q;YQ|UQ, Q)− IP (VQ, Q;ZQ|UQ, Q)
= IP (Vτ ;Yτ |Uτ )− IP (Vτ ;Zτ |Uτ )
≤ C¯(τb0 + (1− τ)b1),
which establishes the concavity of C¯(·).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 11
The proof is standard, however, we provide it for completeness. Let P (µ)(·) := Eµ
[
P (Bn)(·)] and PP (µ) denote
the random coding PMF and its induced probability measure, respectively. Also, define
ζ
(n)
1 (δ) := infνu,v,y:
(u,v,y)/∈T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )
DKL (νu,v,y‖PU,V,Y )− |U||V||Y| log(n+ 1)
n
,
where νu,v,y denotes the empirical PMF of (u,v,y) ∈ Un×Vn×Yn. Note that for δ > 0 and n sufficiently large,
ζ
(n)
1 (δ) > 0 .
First, consider the probability of the error event E1(1, 1, 1) averaged over the random codebook Bn. We have
Eµ
[
PP (Bn)
(E1(1, 1, 1)∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))] = PP (µ)((U(1),V(1, 1, 1),Y) /∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y ))
≤ e−nζ(n)1 (δ) −→
n
0, (56)
where the inequality in (56) follows from Lemmas 2.2 and 2.6 in [50].
Next, we analyze the probability of the error event E2(1, 1, 1) averaged over Bn. Note that for (j,m) 6= (1, 1)
and sufficiently large n,
PP (µ)
((
U(1),V(1, j,m),Y
) ∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))
=
∑
(u,v,y) ∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )
P⊗nU,V (u,v)P
⊗n
Y |U (y|u)
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≤
∑
(u,v,y) ∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )
e−n(HP (U,V )+HP (Y |U)−O(δ))
≤ e−n(HP (U,V )+HP (Y |U)−HP (U,V,Y )−O(δ))
= e−n(IP (V ;Y |U)−O(δ)).
Hence,
Eµ
[
PP (Bn)
(E2(1, 1, 1)∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))]
≤
∑
(j,m)∈ Jn×Mn:
(j,m) 6=(1,1)
PP (µ)
((
U(1),V(1, j,m),Y
) ∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))
≤ en(R2+R−IP (V ;Y |U)+O(δ)).
This implies that for δ sufficiently small and n large enough, there exists ζ2(δ) > 0 such that
Eµ
[
PP (Bn)
(E2(1, 1, 1)∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))] ≤ e−nζ2(δ) −→
n
0, (57)
provided (25) holds.
Finally, consider the third error event E3(1, 1, 1). We have for i 6= 1 and sufficiently large n that
PP (µ)
((
U(i),V(i, j,m),Y
) ∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))
=
∑
(u,v,y) ∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )
P⊗nU,V (u,v)P
⊗n
Y (y)
≤
∑
(u,v,y) ∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )
e−n(HP (U,V )+HP (Y )−O(δ))
≤ e−n(HP (U,V )+HP (Y )−HP (U,V,Y )−O(δ))
= e−n(IP (U,V ;Y )−O(δ)).
Hence,
Eµ
[
PP (Bn)
(E3(1, 1, 1)∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))]
≤
∑
(i,j,m)∈ In×Jn×Mn:
i6=1
PP (µ)
((
U(i),V(i, j,m),Y
) ∈ T (n)δ (PU,V,Y )∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))
≤ en(R1+R2+R−IP (U,V ;Y )+O(δ)).
Thus, it follows that for δ sufficiently small and n large enough, there exists ζ3(δ) > 0 such that
Eµ
[
PP (Bn)
(E3(1, 1, 1)∣∣(I, J,M) = (1, 1, 1))] ≤ e−nζ3(δ) −→
n
0, (58)
provided (26) holds. The claim in the lemma follows from (56), (57) and (58) via the union bound on probability
applied to the left hand side of (27).
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